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I. HOW THE COURTS UNDERSTAND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
This Article holds that the openness and indeterminacy of the main
judicial test of commercial speech regulation actually opens the door to
valuable legal and social possibilities. In particular, this Article shall argue
that courts can and should normally subject regulation of purely
commercial speech to test merely the reasonableness of such regulation.
The reason for doing so, upon which this Article focuses, is that this test
would best promote the most important version of the value of self-
realization that underlies freedom of speech itself.
This version of self-realization focuses mainly on freely-arrived-at
human flourishing, personal development, genuine fulfillment, and
happiness. Having an understanding of this crucial form of self-realization
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casts light on the relevant institutional power relationships that characterize
our culture. Once we grasp these institutional power relationships, we can
better see the logic of what amounts to minimum scrutiny for purely
commercial speech regulations. Crucially, we must avoid simply assuming
that a more rigorous judicial test of commercial speech regulation must
automatically promote the crucial values underlying freedom of speech in
the first place.
This Article will present no precise definition of commercial speech.
The idea of commercial speech probably cannot be defined with precision,
but the intuitive idea is clear enough for our purposes. The Supreme Court
has sought to define commercial speech in two different ways, with both
apparent definitions embodying imperfections. The Court first defined
commercial speech in terms of "speech proposing a commercial
transaction."' Apart from the limited value of defining both "commercial"
and "speech" by incorporating both terms crucially into its own definition,2
there is also a problem of underinclusion. To define all commercial speech
in terms of "proposals"' for commercial transactions is grossly
underinclusive as a matter of logic. We do not, by analogy, define the idea
of a "'hand" in terms exclusively of left hands. Commercial transactions,
and presumably commercial speech, comprise more than proposals.
Proposals can be answered, for example, by a rejection or request for
clarification, but a rejection or request for clarification of a commercial
proposal can also amount to purely commercial speech, without amounting
to a proposal or a counter-proposal. 4 So this definition of commercial
speech is at best grossly underinclusive.
The Court has, however, also apparently defined commercial speech
as an "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience."' Here, the reference to "economic interests" 6 lends a
substantive tone to the definition. And we can certainly understand the
desire to focus narrowly on "solely" 7 economic interests. For example,
imagine a political candidate's policy speech on macroeconomics or global
trade. Surely, we could think of such a speech as fully protected political
speech. And it might seem relevant that speaker or listener interests
beyond economics-certainly beyond any discrete economic transaction-
could be involved. Or we might think of an advertisement for a traditional
1. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562 (1980) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)), quoted
in Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 742 (9th Cir. 2006).
2. See id. at 562.
3. See id
4. Presumably, even an unqualified acceptance of a commercial proposal could also
amount to commercial speech without constituting a proposal in its own right.
5. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561, quoted in Ballen, 466 F.3d at 741.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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political magazine, aimed at enhancing circulation. Certainly, such a
speech could partake of non-economic and non-commercial elements.
This alternative definition's focus on an exclusive relation to
"economic" interests does, however, threaten an opposite problem. Merely
for the sake of argument, let us assume that clearly commercial speech by
the sellers of goods and services is motivated by, and related solely to, the
sellers' economic interests. But we should still hardly assume that
commercial speech, with respect to potential buyers of all goods and
services, relates solely to economic interests. The interests of sellers and
buyers may be of a dramatically different character.
Even as to buyers, we may assume that commercial advertising,
insofar as it focuses solely on price, relates solely to the potential buyer's
economic interests. We may set aside the fact that price is sometimes a
matter of status, prestige, or of self-image beyond purely economic
dimensions. But even so, in an advanced consumer society, the appeal of
some commercial speech is not only, if at all, to the buyer's economic
interests. Some commercial speech appeals to interests in social
relationships, self-esteem, public image, play value, distraction, the value
of a vague association with celebrity, refinement in taste, popularity and
belonging, novelty or excitement, or even to happiness itself, in senses
distinct from the buyer's economic interests as normally defined.
However the courts choose to define commercial speech, it is clear
that the courts display ambivalence as to the constitutional value of
commercial speech and its regulation. On the one hand, it is claimed that
commercial speech "not only serves the economic interest of the speaker,
but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest
possible dissemination of information,"0 giving commercial speech
"important informational value.,"10 It has been claimed as well, if perhaps
with some ambiguity, that a "particular consumer's interest in the free flow
of commercial information . .. may be as keen, if not keener by far, than
his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."" Of course, persons
8. Consider, for example, the implausibility of the claim that all clearly commercial
speech by Chanel, Pfizer, Merck, Rolex, Nike, Old Spice, General Mills, Spalding, or Toys-
R-Us, appeals, on the consumer side, solely to the economic interests of the potential
consumer. For a much closer case, see Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (Stevens,
J., concurring). For another case on the vague border between commercial and political
speech, see SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 583 F.3d 1340, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (denying petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc).
9. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62, quoted in W. Va. Ass'n of Club Owners &
Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 2009).
10. See Musgrave, 553 F.3d at 301.
11. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
763 (1976), quoted in Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366-67 (2002). For
an attempt to partially bridge this gap between commercial speech and speech bearing upon
democratic decisionmaking, see Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial
Speech, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1, 15-20 (2000).
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may take no subjective interest in matters of the highest public interest or
keen interest in utter trivia.
On the other hand, it is sometimes recognized that much of the
standard post-New-Deal administrative regulatory state depends upon the
government's ability to restrict or mandate purely commercial speech
without having to pass exacting judicial scrutiny. It has thus been argued
that
restrictions on commercial speech do not often repress individual
self-expression; they rarely interfere with the functioning of
democratic political processes; and they often reflect a
democratically determined governmental decision to regulate a
commercial venture in order to protect, for example, the
consumer, the public health, individual safety, or the
environment. 12
Also, while freedom of speech is also said to promote the search for truth in
various important realms, 13 commercial speech sometimes intends no
recognizable assertion that could be considered as true or false.14 More
importantly, where commercial speech actually intends to make potentially
true or false claims about any broader cultural, economic, or political
issues, it ceases to be purely commercial speech." Thus, we can
12. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he State's power to regulate
commercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial speech that
is 'linked inextricably' to those transactions.")).
13. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76-77 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.,
Penguin Books 1974) (1859); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 119,130-33 (1989); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REv. 1 (1995).
14. In a sense, all speech (including all commercial speech) at least dimly hints at
some proposition that has some relation to truth or falsity or to value and disvalue.
Advertising speech that is vaguely evocative or imagistic but non-verbal could fall into this
category. Likewise falling into this category are vague commercial commands, such as to
"buy product X," or perhaps even to "Just Do It." But if there is, by the speaker's intention,
a sufficient invocation of some cognizable broader social issue, the speech ceases to be
purely commercial speech.
15. For discussion, see Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for
General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 235, 235-36 (1998). Among the cases, see the controversy surrounding the proper
characterization of Nike's speech in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) and the
distinction drawn in Virginia Pharmacy: "Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on
any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political. He does not wish to report any particularly
newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even about commercial matters."
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761. For the idea of "inextricable intertwining" of
commercial and fully protected political speech, see Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. ofN. Y v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474-75 (1989); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-
68 (1983); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562 n.5 (1980); BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Farris, 542 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2008). To
the extent, though, that commercial speech is "inextricably intertwined" not with private-
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understand a certain ambivalence about the value, in free speech terms and
otherwise, of commercial speech.
II. THE OPENNESS AND INDETERMINACY OF THE CENTRAL HUDSON
COMMERCIAL SPEECH TEST
The standard judicial test for regulating typical commercial speech
reflects, in its broad openness and indeterminacy, this judicial ambivalence
about commercial speech in general. The crucial Central Hudson test,'6 as
later modified,17 involves four elements. As a prerequisite to receiving any
free speech protection, the commercial speech first must not be false,
misleading, deceptive, or amount to a proposal for an illegal transaction.
If the commercial speech passes this minimum threshold, the court will
then ask whether the government has presented a substantial or significant
interest or purpose for regulating the speech in question.19 Third, the
government must then show that the regulation in question "directly"
advances the asserted governmental interest.20 Fourth and finally, the
regulation must in some appropriate fashion be sufficiently narrowly
21tailored with respect to promoting the government interest in question.
Of course, this bare description of the widely used Central Hudson
commercial speech test hardly begins to convey any sense of the broad
openness and indeterminacy of the test and, most especially, of the crucial
fourth or narrow-tailoring prong. But it is certainly possible to briefly
indicate below a few of the relevant indeterminacies and opposing
tendencies.
The Central Hudson commercial speech regulation test, to begin with,
has a somewhat murky relationship to the even murkier distinction between
party political speech, but with official non-regulatory speech by the government itself,
somewhat different problems are raised. See W. Va. Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal
Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 2009).
16. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367; Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001).
17. In particular, see the clarification, or the loosening, of the fourth or narrow-
tailoring prong as elaborated in Fox, 492 U.S. at 480-81. Despite this modification,
Professor Martin Redish plausibly argues that the Central Hudson test, even as thus
modified by Fox, has generally been applied over time in a more commercial-speech-
protective way. See Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism
and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 67, 68 (2007).
This development-simultaneous loosening and tightening-itself illustrates what this
Article is referring to as the distinct "openness" of the Central Hudson test. See also
Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick It Up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial
Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1205, 1216 (2004) (noting the unpredictability in applying
Central Hudson and calling for a more stringent test).
18. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.; Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
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content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech in general. 2 2  It
seems to be typically assumed that garden-variety regulation of purely
commercial speech normally evokes the Central Hudson test-or perhaps a
more rigorous test if the regulation is deemed to be narrowly
paternalistic 2 3-regardless of whether the regulation migh4 t also be
somehow characterized as content-based or content-neutral. 4 And the
Central Hudson test is often thought of as roughly akin, as a test of vaguely
intermediate scrutiny, to the similarly intermediate degree of scrutiny
associated with content-neutral speech regulations in general.2 5
Occasional attempts have been made to distinguish the Central
Hudson commercial speech test from the general content-neutral regulation
test. 26 The most obvious way in which the two formulas commonly differ
is that under the content-neutral regulation test, but not under Central
Hudson, the regulation must leave open and available for the speaker
"ample alternative channels for communication."2 7 Courts may imagine
that some sort of narrow-tailoring requirement will cover the same ground
or serve the same purposes, as such an ample-remaining speech channel
22. For discussion, see R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral
Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333
(2006).
23. For hints of a more rigorous constitutional test of classically paternalistic
regulation of commercial speech, see the opinions in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484 (1996) (plurality opinion) (limitations on store advertising of the prices of
legally available alcohol) and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001).
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (restriction of truthful
commercial speech based on government fear of the ideas conveyed as deserving of strict
scrutiny).
24. See, e.g., Metro Lights, L.L.C. v. City of L.A., 551 F.3d 898, 903 n.6 (9th Cir.
2009) (citing Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 743-44 (9th Cir. 2006))
("[W]hether or not the City's regulation is content-based, the Central Hudson test still
applies because of the reduced protection given to commercial speech."). See also Naser
Jewelers, Inc. v. City of Concord, 513 F.3d 27, 31 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008) (commercial speech
test as "substantially similar" to that for a time, place, or manner restriction on speech,
which is often casually assumed to incorporate a requirement of content neutrality as well).
25. See, e.g., Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (N.R.
Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Naser Jewelers, 513 F.3d at 33-34. For
the general intermediate-level stringency of the Central Hudson test, whatever its openness
and indeterminacy, see Charles Fischette, A New Architecture of Commercial Speech Law,
31 HAv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 663, 664 (2008) ("[C]ommercial speech is entitled to
substantial but reduced protection under the First Amendment[.]").
26. See, e.g., Gen. Auto Serv. Station v. City of Chi., 526 F.3d 991, 1007-08 (7th Cir.
2008).
27. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-26 (2000); Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984)); Naser Jewelers, 513 F.3d at 33-34. See also Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534
U.S. 316, 323 n.3 (2002) (quoting Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123, 130 (1992)).
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requirement. This would, however, be clearly and importantly false.28 A
regulation could be magnificently tailored to its purposes and thus neither
underinclusive nor overinclusive, while leaving a speaker with anywhere
from many to zero alternative ways or channels to convey its message.29 In
any event, the standard commercial speech regulation tests usually make no
explicit reference to a requirement that speakers be left with other ways of
communicating their messages.
There is a sense in which some commercial speech regulations are
based on the content of the speech. Of course, any regulation that is aimed
specifically at commercial speech will require enforcement authorities to
look at the content of the speech to determine whether the given instance of
speech falls within the scope of the regulation.3 1 But it is far from being
clear that the obvious and inevitable need to examine the message, to see
merely whether it is commercial or not, should prompt the courts to
abandon Central Hudson for a more rigorous content-based test. 32
Yet, there also seem to be cases of commercial speech regulation in
which a form of relatively rigorous scrutiny might seem appropriate.
Imagine a statute that read simply: "All purely commercial speech on the
Internet by registered Democrats is prohibited." We should not be swept
away by the obviousness of the right outcome in such a case to a hasty
choice among theories and tests. Such a commercial speech regulation
would inevitably have indirect political effects and would fail under any
reasonable interpretation of Central Hudson as surely as under strict
scrutiny as a content- or viewpoint-based regulation, let alone under any
test for the equal protection of the laws or the privileges or immunities of
citizens.
More broadly, the openness and indeterminacy of Central Hudson
presents opportunities for judicially validating both broad and narrow
28. See generally R. George Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity ofFree Speech Law
and the Central Importance ofAlternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REv. 57 (1989).
29. See id.
30. But for a merely partial substitute doctrine in the commercial speech area, see infra
notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2009) (N.R.
Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. See id. at 1092 (N.R. Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Presumably, a regulation that applies only to commercial speech requires an evaluation of
the content of the speech to determine the character or type of speech (whether it is
commercial). Yet, this type of evaluation has not generally been held to be content-based
and does not trigger strict scrutiny review.").
33. For cases that are at least arguably tested rigorously based on their respective facts,
see Metro Lights, L.L.C. v. City ofL.A., 551 F.3d 898, 912 (9th Cir. 2009); Ballen v. City of
Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2006) (exemption for the "powerful" real estate
industry, but not for, e.g., a lone bagel shop); Passions Video, Inc. v. Nixon, 458 F.3d 837,
839 (8th Cir. 2006) (regulation of the commercial advertising signage of "adult cabarets"
and "sexually oriented" businesses).
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forms of commercial speech regulation where the regulations can be
viewed as reasonable and not improperly discriminatory among forms of
commercial speech. The crucial points would be these: it would be
reasonable for a democratic majority to conclude that, taken as a whole,
commercialism and commercial speech amount to powerful cultural
influences for good or ill. It would also be reasonable to democratically
conclude that even broad limitations on commercial speech in the
aggregate could have favorable effects on freedom of speech in general, on
broader cultural freedom, and on genuine human fulfillment and well-
being, particularly including the most valuable forms of the free speech
value of self-realization. No approach to commercial speech can possibly
be simply politically neutral and unbiased. And no approach to
commercial speech can be said to maximize the value of self-realization
just as a matter of definition. Any approach to commercial speech must
argue substantively for its favorable effects on self-realization, not merely
build them in by definition.
At this point, it is important to emphasize that reasonable regulation of
commercial speech need not take the form of paternalism and need not be
viewed as the powerful suppressing the weak or the poorly organized. It is,
however, reasonable for a society to act on the belief that while many
particular commercial speakers may not intend to promote commercialism
as a general lifestyle, just such a promotion of a commercialized approach
to life may be an important overall effect of commercial speech. Instances
of commercial speech for "competing" products actually do not undermine,
but mutually reinforce, the perhaps unintended overall commercializing
effect on culture. And it is also reasonable to believe that in the absence of
broad commercial speech regulation, there is currently no cultural
institution or any set of such institutions that can meaningfully respond to
the implicit promotion of commercialism at a scale conducive to a
genuinely meaningful debate over our cultural future.
On these assumptions, it is entirely appropriate to respond to the
openness and indeterminacy of the Central Hudson commercial speech test
by generally preferring less, rather than more, stringent test interpretations.
That is, in general, the openness and indeterminacy of Central Hudson
should be taken in the direction of minimum, rather than stricter, judicial
scrutiny of commercial speech regulations. There is already some limited
case authority for this sort of minimalist approach to commercial speech
regulation in certain areas, as in many cases of the governmentally
mandated disclosure of information by commercial speakers.
34. On the minimum scrutiny often given to the government-mandated disclosure of
information in commercial speech cases, see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (The disclosure requirement must
merely be "reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of
consumers."); N.Y State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir.
2009) (required posting of food calorie content information as subject only to a rational
[Vol. 88:1724
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Thus far, it has simply been assumed that the Central Hudson test is
sufficiently open to allow for the reasonable pursuit of what might be
democratically determined to be important constitutional and other public
interests. These interests could involve the non-paternalistic promotion of
free speech itself, worthwhile forms of cultural freedom in general, and the
free pursuit of fulfillment, flourishing, happiness, and well-being.
Therefore, it is important to at least briefly survey some of the relevant
openness and indeterminacy of the Central Hudson test in judicial practice.
While all of the elements of the Central Hudson test are open,
indeterminate, and contestable, this Article will show that the openness of
the fourth or narrow-tailoring prong is of special interest.
A. The Openness of the "Deception" Prong Under Central Hudson
Central Hudson requires an initial determination of the actual, or
potential, deceptivenessV of the speech. But to ask whether an instance of
commercial speech is deceptive or misleading commonly invites a series of
important follow-up questions with no determinate answers. Even the most
basic judicial distinctions in this regard, such as whether the commercial
speech is inherently, actually, or only potentially misleading, are
themselves misleading and open to indefinite re-characterization. 36
Consider the advertising claim that a particular brand of orange juice
contains no cholesterol. Is that a true claim or an inherently, or potentially,
misleading claim? 37 Is it not necessary to somehow consider the context,
including the knowledge base of some selected audience for the
commercial speech in question? Will determining the appropriate audience
basis test); Nat'! Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2001); Pharm.
Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 & n.8 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 651). For possible limits on the regulatory purposes in such cases, if minimum
scrutiny is to remain applicable, see United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 416
(2001). For the appropriateness of more demanding scrutiny of compelled disclosure where
the commercial speech is "inextricably intertwined" with fully protected political speech,
see Riley v. Nat'! Fed'n of the Blind offN.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988), discussed in Bd. of Trs. of
the State Univ. of NY. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989). For a critique of Riley, see R.
George Wright, Free Speech and the Mandated Disclosure of Information, 25 U. RICH. L.
REV. 475 (1991).
35. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., R. George Wright, Freedom and Culture: Why We Should Not Buy
Commercial Speech, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 137, 162-64 (1994) [hereinafter Freedom and
Culture]. For a recent judicial finding of potentially (as opposed to actually) misleading
commercial speech, see Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 2009) (unlicensed
use of the "interior designer" job title as only potentially, as opposed to actually, misleading,
even though some consumers presumably know of the license requirement-perhaps
reflecting subconscious judicial skepticism over any real need for licensing "interior
designers" as vaguely defined).
37. See, e.g., Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988) (attorney
commercial speech case concerned with speech that "unduly emphasizes trivial or
'relatively uninformative fact[s]"').
Fall 20 10] 25
UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:17
and the appropriate-audience-survey methodology usually be
uncontroversial? Young children tend to be misled by commercial speech
that would mislead no competent adult. But is it clear how much weight to
attach to any degree of incomprehension by young children if the product is
intended to be bought by adults?" Even if it is assumed that misled
children drive the purchases of adults, are courts not in other speech
contexts reluctant to hold adult audiences hostage to standards approriate
for (some young) children? 39 Would a disclaimer of some sort help?4
But the openness and indeterminacy of the "misleadingness" inquiry
only continues to unfold. Often, a crucial question is not whether the
commercial speaker's claim is in any sense misleading to any audience, but
whether the speaker can fairly be said to have implied the supposedly
misleading claim at all, or whether the claim is being unfairly read into the
speech. 4 1 And then there is the sheer openness of the question of how
much real harm potentially misleading commercial speech is likely to
cause.4 2 Can there be a substantial state interest in regulating misleading
commercial speech if there are no significant consequences from the
misleadingness of that speech?
B. The Joint Openness of the "Substantial-Interest" and the "Direct-
Advance" Prongs Under Central Hudson
This line of inquiry eventually leads into the openness and
indeterminacy of the second Central Hudson requirement-that there be
some substantial or significant governmental interest at stake.4 3
Realistically, crucial choices, including subtle shifts in the burden of proof,
are open to judicial discretion. Generally, the range of possible judicial
choices would cover every set of circumstances between the sheer
conceivability of merely legitimate governmental interests (with little
attention to burdens of proof)4 all the way to just short of any genuinely
compelling, clearly demonstrated governmental interest.45 The Supreme
Court has, closer to the latter end of the spectrum, rejected a merely
38. See, e.g., ITT Cont'l Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 214 (2d Cir. 1976)
(concerning Captain Kangaroo's "fantasy growth" claim to produce tree-like stature among
viewers through (at least in part) consuming Wonder Bread).
39. Classically, see Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
40. See R. George Wright, Your Mileage May Vary: A General Theory of Legal
Disclaimers, 7 PIERCE L. REv. 85 (2009).
41. See, e.g., ITT Cont'I Baking Co., 532 F.2d at 213.
42. See Freedom and Culture, supra note 36, at 163-64.
43. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
44. That is, anything more demanding than the minimal standards embodied in, say,
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (setting aside a state
supreme court's arguably realistic equal protection analysis).
45. For a broader discussion of the idea of a compelling government interest, see
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed
Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REv. 917 (1988).
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hypothetical state interest in the Central Hudson context 46 and has on some
occasions described the state interest requirement as being "significantly
stricter than the rational basis test." 4 7
For a real sense of the openness and indeterminacy of what may or
may not count as a substantial governmental interest under Central
Hudson, the inseparable third or "direct-advance" element must be
considered as well.4 8 On the one hand, any court may insist that the
government "demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."49 Any
assertions made by the government in this regard may be independently
evaluated. 0 But on the other hand, courts may take a laxer approach in this
regard. The courts may instead choose to allow a government to rely, for
example, on surveys taken in other jurisdictions,5' on what is thought to be
common sense," or on sheer anecdote. The room for judicial
maneuver in applying the Central Hudson second and third prongs is thus
substantial and again allows for liberalization of the overall test for the
purposes outlined herein.
C. The Joint Openness of the "Direct-Advance" and the "Narrow-
Tailoring" Prongs Under Central Hudson
The third Central Hudson prong, or "direct-advance" prong, is in turn
difficult to separate, in practice and even in theory, from the fourth and
final "narrow-tailoring" prong. Both in some fashion consider the
46. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
47. See, e.g., id at 374.
48. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
49. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999)
(quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)); W. Va. Ass'n of Club Owners &
Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 303 (4th Cir. 2009).
50. See, e.g., Musgrave, 553 F.3d at 303.
51. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001); Musgrave,
553 F.3d at 303. In the context of what is treated as a content-neutral restriction on sexually
explicit speech, see City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986) (no
need for new independent local studies, subject to a reasonable belief in the relevance of
other studies).
52. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 555 (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
628 (1995)), quoted in Musgrave, 553 F.3d at 303. In the area of the regulation of sexually
explicit speech, see City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002) (on the
sufficiency of appeals to "common sense" as distinguished from empirical evidence). For
skepticism, however, toward "common sense" in a closely related context, see Horina v.
City of Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 2008) ("common sense ... can all-too-
easily be used to mask unsupported conjecture, which is, of course, verboten in the First
Amendment context[.]"), quoted in Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th
Cir. 2009) (preliminarily enjoining the prohibition of leafleting of unoccupied vehicles on
city streets).
53. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 555; Musgrave, 553 F.3d at 303.
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regulatory means chosen in light of the regulatory goal, or goals, sought.5 4
The two prongs are, by the Court's own admission, not always
distinguishable.
For the sake of an oversimplified but manageable model, it could be
said that the third or direct-advance prong emphasizes achieving rather than
failing to achieve the goal of the regulation, which could be linked to
avoiding underinclusiveness of the regulation. 5 6  The fourth or narrow-
tailoring prong could be said, in contrast, to emphasize, with one degree of
stringency or another, the costs of a regulation's overinclusiveness or of
sweeping too broadly.57  While it is fair to think of the fourth prong as
focusing on degrees of overinclusiveness, it should be mentioned, for the
sake of avoiding confusion, that the Supreme Court has declined to apply
what is technically called the "overbreadth" doctrine in commercial speech
58cases.
As for the fourth prong itself, it is said that the burden of proof on
sufficiently narrow tailoring is on the regulating government.5 9 However,
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, as clarified in cases such as
Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,60 is one of
intermediate-or realistically indeterminate-scrutiny. The courts
plainly vary in their approach to intermediate scrutiny in the specific
context of the required degree of tailoring.
This judicial equivocation derives in part from our obvious cultural
ambivalence about the underlying value of commercial speech in our
constitutional system. On the one hand, the courts sometimes assign a
subordinate constitutional value to talk of commercial buying and selling,
as distinct from talk of broader civic concerns.62 But there is also
54. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1993) ("[T]he last
two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve a consideration of the 'fit'
between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends."); Metro
Lights, L.L.C. v. City of L.A., 551 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2009).
55. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999)
(deeming the four Central Hudson stages as "not entirely discrete"); see also Metro Lights,
551 F.3d at 904.
56. See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Farris, 542 F.3d 499, 508 (6th Cir. 2008).
57. See id.
58. For the non-applicability of the "overbreadth" doctrine in the commercial speech
area, see Vill. of Hoffnan Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497
(1982); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 618 n.12 (1998) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 670 (1994). Whether a current majority of
the Court might be inclined to modify or abolish this rule is of course difficult to say.
59. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993);
Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 742 (9th Cir. 2006).
60. See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1989).
61. See, e.g., Verizon Cal. v. FCC, 555 F.3d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
62. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562-63 (1980) ("The Constitution ... accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than
to other constitutionally guaranteed expression." (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
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recognition that in a realistic sense, we care more about, and are more
affected by, commercial speech than by political speech at any level,
including campaign rhetoric. This Article's thesis herein seeks to
synthesize the insights of both of these views. In certain respects,
commercial speech has come to assume a position, not merely of
importance, but of pre-eminence. But such pre-eminence can, in some
respects, justify a greater and not a lesser regulatory concern.
On the one hand, there is ample support in the case law for a limited,
deferential judicial approach to the narrow-tailoring prong under Central
Hudson. Thus, the case law seeks only a "reasonable fit" between the
substantial governmental interest promoted and the scope of the regulatory
means chosen.' The required "reasonable fit," despite language and dicta
occasionally to the contrary, need not amount to the least speech-restrictive
means capable of promoting the substantial interest at stake. 65  As in
content-neutral regulation of speech, the regulation of commercial speech
must simply "not 'burden substantially more speech than is necessary.'",66
In particular, "if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome
alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a
relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between ends and
means is reasonable."
On the other hand, however, the courts often interpret the Central
Hudson narrow-tailoring prong with considerable rigor. To begin with,
"regulating speech must be a last-not first-resort."6 8  The commercial
speech regulation must be "'designed carefully' to achieve the stated
goal."69 Most crucially, the government must show that it has "'carefully
calculated' the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech
imposed by its prohibition."7 o In particular, the government must
"demonstrate a careful calculation of the speech interests involved." 7
436 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1978))); see also United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418,
426 (1993); Fox, 492 U.S. at 477. But cf Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 433-34 (denying
any lesser constitutional weight, in itself, to commercial speech per se).
63. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
64. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001); Discovery
Network, 507 U.S. at 416 & n.12; Ballen, 466 F.3d at 742.
65. See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 477-78.
66. Id. at 478 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (in
the content-neutral restriction context)); see also Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 430 (citing
Ward, 491 U.S. at 799); Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 398 F.3d 814, 819-20 (6th
Cir. 2005) (content-neutral sign restriction ordinance).
67. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417 n.13, quoted in Ballen, 466 F.3d at 742.
68. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002); BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc. v. Farris, 542 F.3d 499, 508 (6th Cir. 2008).
69. Verizon Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 555 F.3d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
70. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417 (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480); see also RTM
Media, L.L.C. v. City of Hous., 584 F.3d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 2009); W. Va. Ass'n of Club
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In this context, the requirement that the government show that it has
carefully considered the costs involved, including the commercial free
speech costs of its regulation, invites a judicial re-weighing and re-
balancing of the particular interests at stake by any court so inclined,
without much genuine constraint on any such re-weighing.72 On this
approach, a court might simply speculate about conceivable alternative
regulations that are arguably less burdensome on some of the speech
interests involved overall, in light of the regulatory interests cited.73
Beyond this opening of the door to judicial re-weighing of the
interests involved, the courts have been in no hurry to resolve basic
questions that their judicial re-weighing must inevitably pose. Most
inescapably, is the government allowed to justify its regulation as narrowly
tailored when the regulation is taken as a whole-i.e., either the regulation
in question or no regulation at all--or must the government justify any and
every marginal element of the regulation? That is, must the government
justify any incremental reach of its regulation beyond some minimal scope?
If the regulation could, at least in the imagination of the court, have been
sliced to remove the unappealing "heel" thereof, is the regulation therefore
unconstitutional for lack of narrow tailoring? How thin is the retrospective
"slicing" of the regulation required to be?
Commonly, a commercial speech regulation may aim at some clear
abuses, but the regulation will extend beyond those clear abuses to less
crucial cases. The scope of the regulation may well encompass less crucial
or even debatable cases. Does that mean that the regulation lacks sufficient
tailoring? Would there not, almost inevitably, be some range of cases in
which the regulation is still, to some lesser degree, further promoting the
basic regulatory goal but only at an increasingly steep cost in the value of
the regulated commercial speech?
In such cases, often near the outer limits of the regulation, courts may,
in the name of narrow tailoring, be tempted to judicially re-balance the
interests at stake.74 If there are real or imagined cases in which the payoff
from the regulation strikes the court as only modest when weighed against
the judicially perceived cost in commercial speech or other values, the
courts may well be tempted to find insufficient tailoring." The problem is
Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 305 (4th Cir. 2009); BellSouth
Telecomms., 542 F.3d at 509.
71. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 562 (2001).
72. For such an arguable instance, see id. at 562-66. In a related context, see Prime
Media, Inc. v. City ofBrentwood, 398 F.3d 814, 824 (6th Cir. 2005).
73. See, e.g., Thompson, 535 U.S. at 372; Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562-65; 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507-08 (1996) (rejecting regulation of
alcohol advertising in light of unaddressed conceivable alternative approaches to the cited
problem, including intensified alcohol education programs).
74. For example, see the evident balancing of interests the Court undertakes at or near
the margins of the regulation in Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 564.
75. See, e.g., id at 564-65.
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that most regulations of commercial speech (or of anything else) will
inevitably have "core" areas of application where the net benefit is
relatively high and other areas where the net benefit is relatively low.76
Further complicating the narrow-tailoring inquiry is the scope and
quality of information before the court. As in other sorts of cases, the
commercial speech regulation may have direct or indirect effects, short- or
long-term effects, and positive or negative effects, on various entities not
represented before the court." Therefore, the courts often attempt, on
whatever basis, to evaluate the regulation as applied generally and not just
with respect to the circumstances of those persons challenging the
regulation.7 ' A commercial speech regulation may seem to unduly burden
an aggrieved party, while also being necessary in its breadth of scope, to
adequately address problems posed by other commercial speakers not
before the court.
Commercial speakers as well, even more than non-commercial
speakers, may have financial incentives to be less than entirely forthright
about the actual speech effects of various conceivable regulations. Courts
will already have difficulty enough in telling whether one rule is really less
burdensome overall than another. Commercial speakers may well be
motivated to seek to maximize their profitability, not their freedom of
commercial speech. Merely as one possible example, a commercial
speaker could have a financial incentive to represent some alternative
commercial speech regulation as less burdensome and more narrowly
tailored, whatever its financial or free speech costs, if the speaker knows
that such a regulation would realistically not be imposed in practice. 9
Introducing even further openness into the narrow-tailoring inquiry, an
important additional complication is that commercial speech regulations,
like most sensible behavior,8 0 do not generally seek to maximize any single
substantial government interest to the neglect of all other partly competing
values. Many sensible commercial speech regulations are drafted with
some concern for more than one interest.8 ' It is unlikely (and too much to
76. See generally E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (Routledge,
5th ed. 2007) (1976).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 416, 427 (1993); Metro
Lights, L.L.C. v. City of L.A., 551 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2009).
78. See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 427; Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at 904.
79. Thus, a commercial speaker might endorse, as less burdensome and more narrowly
tailored, a tax on its conduct, rather than direct regulation of its speech, even if the tax
would put the speaker out of business, which would end the speech as long as the tax
alternative in reality could be blocked by lobbying. For discussion of a tax alternative to the
regulation of commercial speech, see 44 Liquornart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
507 (1996).
80. See, classically, the work on marginalism in ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF
EcoNoMIcs ch. 18 (Prometheus Books 1997) (1881).
81. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 368 (2002)
(government as citing three distinct interests underlying the commercial speech regulation);
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expect) that the drafters will specify all of their valued interests, along with
their perceived conflicts and trade-off rates. In many cases, among the
interests valued by the drafters will be the interests we have in commercial
speech.
The problem is that any commercial speech regulation that sensibly
balances a number of partly conflicting interests will not be maximizing the
promotion of any single interest. Any court inclined to do so can thus find
the commercial speech regulation to lack sufficient tailoring, 82 as the
regulation is aimed at both more and less than promoting some single
interest upon which a court has chosen to focus. But this is, crucially, all
within a court's discretion. If a court chooses to do so, it can instead
recognize some of the multiple interests at stake, appreciate the various
complexities involved, and reasonably defer on the question of narrow
tailoring.
A final source of sheer openness and indeterminacy in testing for
narrow tailoring involves an occasional judicial attempt to distinguish
between those regulations that amount to a complete, or nearly complete,
ban 84 on a form of commercial speech and those that do not. The former
variety of regulation could then receive somewhat more rigorous judicial
scrutiny,ss especially under the narrow-tailoring prong. This is sometimes
known, whether in commercial or noncommercial speech contexts, as the
complete (or nearly complete) "suppression doctrine."
The problem and the source of further openness here is that almost
any absolute or nearly absolute ban on a form or medium of commercial
speech can easily be re-characterized in less absolutist terms. A
commercial speaker who is barred from using off-premises advertising
Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2006) (regulation having ten
separate exceptions of varying degrees of plausibility).
82. A closely related judicial concern might also be expressed under the third prong, as
the regulation may well appear to fail to directly or materially advance the single
government interest upon which judicial attention is focused. See, e.g., Metro Lights, 551
F.3d at 904-05.
83. See, e.g., W. Va. Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553
F.3d 292, 294 (4th Cir. 2009) (The court recognized, in the context of video lottery
advertising, the State's understandable attempts to balance the goals of raising revenue for
education and other purposes against the risks and costs of increasing addiction to gambling:
"It is this interest in a balanced approach to lottery promotion that would be eviscerated by
the wholesale invalidation of West Virginia's advertising restrictions.").
84. See, e.g., Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 398 F.3d 814, 824 (6th Cir.
2005).
85. See id.; cf Passions Video, 458 F.3d at 843 (referring to an "absolute proscription
against any form of off-site advertising").
86. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Morales, 556 F.3d 1037, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (the
suppression doctrine as referring to "foreclosing or nearly foreclosing an entire medium of
expression").
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signs 87 can often presumably re-direct the same advertising budget nearly
as effectively into other advertising venues. To say that the government
has blocked (or nearly blocked) one means of commercial speech says
almost nothing about the existence or free speech value of any remaining
channels for commercial speech available to the speaker.88  Whether a
court chooses to say that a commercial speech regulation blocks (or nearly
blocks) an "entire" single means of communication is largely within the
court's discretion.
The narrow-tailoring inquiry under Central Hudson is thus the source
of much of the openness and indeterminacy of the overall test. This should
not be surprising, as there are parallel states of affairs under even more
rigorous judicial tests that should be less vulnerable to judicial
manipulation. Thus, even in the political speech context, Justice Blackmun
observed that "[a] judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not
come up with something a little less 'drastic' or a little less 'restrictive' in
almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation
down."8
Even more pointedly, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski recently observed:
Fortunately for my colleagues, their proposed solutions [do
not] need to pass constitutional muster; they can just toss them
out as supposedly superior alternatives. But if the city were
gullible enough to follow these suggestions, my colleagues would
find reasons to strike down the new rules in the next round of
litigation. This artifice can be repeated many times, to the delight
of plaintiff and the general enrichment of the legal profession.
With respect to commercial speech in particular, some courts have
recognized some of the dangers of aggressive narrow-tailoring review.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has appreciated that "[t]he
danger of getting too deep into the fourth Central Hudson prong of
tailoring is that it enmeshes federal courts in a wealth of subsidiary. . .
87. See Passions Video, 458 F.3d at 843 (citing State v. Caf6 Erotica, Inc., 507 S.E.2d
732, 735 (Ga. 1998)).
88. See Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City of Concord, 513 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2008)
("[T]he argument raises the issue of how one defines 'medium[]' . . . . [T]he fact that a
regulation bans a particular medium does not mean that the ordinance is not narrowly
tailored." (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 100 F.3d
175, 191-92 (1st Cir. 1996))). The court then pointed out the continuing availability to
commercial speakers of "static and manually changeable signs." Id.
89. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
90. Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1062 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting) (non-commercial speech context).
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issues, which have historically been left to the state legislatures and
agencies that create and implement these programs.""
Of course, this Article's focus has been not only on judicial intrusion
into matters of policy and pragmatics better left to elected or expert
officials, but on the openness of the entire narrow-tailoring inquiry,92 along
with the rest of Central Hudson in general. And it has shown that the
scope of legitimate indeterminacy thereunder is large enough to
accommodate a deferential approach to commercial speech regulation,
especially (as will now be discussed) when reasonable commercial speech
regulation in general can be sensibly defended on broad policy and free
speech-based grounds.
III. SELF-REALIZATION AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE
This Article has briefly referred, above, to the specific free speech
values or purposes of the pursuit of truth and the promotion of genuinely
democratic decision-making.94  But it has also been suggested that these
two free speech values do not constitute the most central battleground on
which issues of the depth of protection for commercial speech should be
fought.95 Of the typically acknowledged reasons for especially protecting
many forms of speech in general, the value of self-realization seems
actually most crucial to the case for or against specially protecting
commercial speech under contemporary circumstances.
The overall relationship between strong or weak First Amendment
protection for purely commercial speech and the value of self-realization
can at the very least be quite reasonably contested. One important
complication is that there are two distinct and partially conflicting
interpretations of the idea of self-realization. 96 It is thus often necessary for
the public or for their democratically elected representatives, if not also for
the courts, to somehow choose one understanding of self-realization or the
other, or some prioritized combination thereof. Crucially, no one can opt
for one view of the free speech value of self-realization over another on the
91. W. Va. Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292,
307 (4th Cir. 2009).
92. For a concrete illustration of the openness of the narrow-tailoring and the related
direct-advance prongs, see Metro Lights, L.L.C. v. City of L.A., 551 F.3d 898, 910 (9th Cir.
2009) (note the re-characterizability of the plaintiff's preferred alternative regulation).
93. For an interesting contrasting argument in the strict scrutiny context, see Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144
U. PA. L. REv. 2417, 2417 (1996) (arguing that, in some instances, a state regulation passes
strict scrutiny in the sense that the State can defend the regulation as narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling government interest; yet a court likely would and should strike the
speech regulation down as unconstitutional).
94. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
95. See id.
96. See infra Section III.A.
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theory that her preferred view is simply required by either the dictionary or
the text of the Free Speech Clause. Whatever view anyone chooses to take
of self-realization, and of the related status and effects of commercial
speech and its regulation, must be argued for on the merits for our own
cultural context.
In particular, no one should start by merely assuming in favor of
strongly protected commercial speech, determining which understanding of
self-realization most naturally supports that pre-determined outcome, and
then claiming that exactly that understanding of self-realization is required
by the dictionary or by the Free Speech Clause itself. If we are, as seems
sensible, to steer free speech law in light of the basic purposes or genuinely
important values to be promoted by freedom of speech, we must be more
pragmatic. Strong protection for commercial speech may promote self-
realization in some senses (but not others) or to different degrees. And the
Free Speech Clause itself does not tell which forms or degrees of self-
realization are themselves most valuable. This decision must be made on
other grounds in light of our broader interests and goals.
This Article's conclusion herein will be that in our own current
cultural context, one particular understanding of the value of self-
realization can and should take general precedence over others in the
typical run of commercial free speech cases,97 and that this particular
understanding of self-realization is typically suggestive of something like a
mere reasonableness test for the regulation of purely commercial speech.
But it is appreciated that reasonable minds could differ as to this
conclusion. To those who remain ultimately unconvinced by this Article's
recommended approach to the value of self-realization and the reasonable
regulation of commercial speech, it must be asked in the end why their own
approaches are so clearly and strongly superior that judges should feel
entitled on that basis to override entirely reasonable legally-adopted
understandings of the value of self-realization.
A. Two Views of the Free Speech Value of Self-Realization
As for the value of self-realization itself, some complications are
inevitable. Students of free speech and social philosophers more broadly
have recognized two distinct, partly conflicting understandings of the idea
of self-realization as arguably underlying freedom of speech. It is possible
to focus on either of these two understandings and to then argue on either
basis for or against generally strong commercial free speech protection.
But it seems more natural to link one, but not the other, of these alternative
understandings of self-realization with relatively strong protection of
commercial speech and vice versa.
For the sake of convenience, these alternative conceptions will be
referred to with numerical subscripts as self-realization, and self-
97. See infra Sections III.B. and IV.
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realization 2. For the sake of some initial clarity, self-realization 1 can
generally be linked to any given person's somehow choosing as she
happens to wish, and acting (buying or not buying) on that basis. This
initial description, of course, leaves much unexplored. But the basic idea is
roughly that of personal choice (or conduct libertarianism) in the realm of
consumer purchases.
In contrast, self-realization 2 can be thought of as descended from lines
of thou ht developed by Plato, 9 8 Aristotle,99 John Stuart Mill, 00 and T.H.
Green.' I Historically, self-realization 2 tends to more strongly emphasize
the ideas of development, higher and lower value, fulfillment or lack of
fulfillment, flourishing, unfolding, self-actualization, and in some senses
self-perfection.102  Modern self-realization 2 is compatible with a high
priority for liberty, autonomy, diversity, and equality for and among all
103persons.
Many contemporary free speech theorists tend not to dwell on such a
distinction at any great length, if at all. But some sense of the distinction
between self-realization 1 and self-realization 2 is often present, as well as of
their possible conflicts. 104 Professor Martin Redish, for example,
98. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 232 (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., The
Legal Classics Library 1991) (1945) ("[T]he entire soul must be turned . .. until its eye can
bear to contemplate reality and that supreme splendour which we have called the Good.").
99. See ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 305 (J.A.K.
Thomson trans., Penguin Books 1955) (1953) ("[O]ught we, so far as in us lies, to put on
immortality and to leave nothing unattempted in the effort to live in conformity with the
highest thing within us."); ANTHONY KENNY, ARISTOTLE ON THE PERFECT LIFE 103 (1992)
(Aristotle on degrees of perfection among different kinds of lives).
100. See MILL, supra note 13, at 121 (quoting von Humboldt on "the highest and most
harmonious development" of one's powers as objectively, and not merely subjectively,
prescribed by reason as the human end). Of course, Mill can also be cited as a crucial
defender of self-realization, as well. See, e.g., id. at 77.
101. See T.H. GREEN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF T.H. GREEN 75-76 (John R. Rodman
ed. 1964) (1881) (distinguishing between choices that fail and those that succeed in reaching
their aim of self-satisfaction). For discussion at length, see DAVID 0. BRINK,
PERFECTIONISM AND THE COMMON GOOD: THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF T.H. GREEN 40-41
(2003) (self-realization in a liberal, egalitarian perfectionist sense as the highest good for
Green).
102. See the liberal egalitarian contemporary versions of perfectionism prefigured in
T.H. Green and developed in, for example, THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM (1993) and
STEVEN WALL, LIBERALISM, PERFECTIONISM AND RESTRAINT (1998). But see STEVEN
LECCE, AGAINST PERFECTIONISM: DEFENDING LIBERAL NEUTRALITY (2008) (attempting to
abstract from issues of value and of living (more or less) well in matters of governance).
103. See, e.g., HURKA, supra note 102, at 148-89; WALL, supra note 102, at 125-204.
Nor does contemporary liberal perfectionism necessarily assume that there is some unique
or fixed human nature, substantially shared by all persons, that is in itself normative or that
trumps the obvious rich diversity among persons of aptitudes, tastes, talents and abilities,
and pursuits. Liberal perfectionism is compatible not only with equality and autonomy, but
with any valuable form of pluralism among ways of life.
104. For the idea of conflicts between these conceptions, see John T. Valauri, Smoking
and Self-Realization: A Reply to Professor Redish, 24 N. KY. L. REv. 585, 591 (1997).
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distinguishes between the "value in allowing individuals to control their
own destiny" 05 and the "value in developing individuals' mental faculties
so that they may reach their full intellectual potential."1 06 As Professor
Redish then develops his self-realization theory, "advertising deserves
substantial constitutional protection since advertising provides information
which is more useful in life decisions than what is available from other
sources."l07
This Article's approach to self-realization and advertising is
developed below. 08 That approach will place substantial emphasis on self-
realization 2 or self-realization as "flourishing." More precisely, some
emphasis is placed on a presumably democratically elected government's
legitimacy in intentionally or unintentionally promoting self-realization 2, or
flourishing, either expressly or by reasonable implication, in reasonably
regulating advertising and other commercial speech.
For the moment though, a few preliminary points are in order. First,
Professor Redish's idea of controlling one's own destiny in this context 09
would of course require some development. There is a sense in which as a
matter of the logic of the terms, no one can possibly control his or her own
destiny or fate; whatever is under our control is not literal destiny or fate.
Professor Redish presumably means that self-realization is in one sense a
matter of controlling something like one's transactional interactions (at
least as to initiating or responding, though of course not as to selecting
market prices) insofar as those choices are affected by commercial speech
rules. The question would then become whether self-realization
understood this way is best promoted by the Central Hudson test, if not by
some more rigorous commercial speech test, or else by a test typically
105. Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A
Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 679-80 (1982).
106. Id. at 680; see also Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 591, 630 (1982). For responses to Professor Redish's distinction, see C. Edwin Baker,
Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value of
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646, 658 (1982) and Valauri, supra note 104, at 590-91.
For additional discussion of self-realization in terms arguably best classified under our sense
of self-realization 2 see, for example, Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization
Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 444 (1998) (quoting Justice Brandeis: 'Those who
won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to
develop their faculties[.]"' (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring))) along with id. at 448-49 ("[i]f the self-realization value on some
level refers to the way in which 'human flourishing' takes place . . ." (citing Margaret Jane
Radin, The Colin Ruagh Thomas O'Fallon Memorial Lecture on Reconsidering
Personhood, 74 OR. L. REV. 423, 433 (1995))). For broader background, see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Two Senses ofAutonomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875 (1994) and, classically, ISAIAH
BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
166 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
107. Valauri, supra note 104, at 587.
108. See infra Section IlI.B.
109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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focused merely on the reasonableness of the regulation. Certainly,
Professor Redish recognizes it is possible that some choices, however, may
for various reasons have unanticipated and self-defeating consequences.
Second, our own understandin of self-realization 2 or flourishing need
not be confined to "intellectual" o self-realization. As contemporary
versions of perfectionism in ethics emphasize,"' there need be no single
optimal manner of living for everyone and no single dimension of life that
should be preferred by everyone. Actually, this element of pluralism and
diversity among writers sympathetic to perfectionism is not, in its
rudiments, new. 12 And a similarly pluralistic and autonomy-respecting
approach could be applied by anyone emphasizing non-intellectualized
self-realization 2 in the realm of commercial speech regulation.
Third, Professor Redish's idea that advertising should, on a self-
realization theory, be substantially protected as an especially useful source
of practical information"' will be controversial in some contexts. Some
contemporary advertising does not even pretend to convey useful
information as opposed to something like entertainment;' 14 vague image or
loose association; atmosphere, mood, or tone; or sheer brand awareness-
some ads do not even mention the product. There are other ways to
motivate than to provide useful information. And even if we count all of
the above as some sort of information, we must then go on to assess its
proper constitutional value.
Doubtless, much current advertising still conveys information useful
for life decisions. But in such cases, the real value of such information, in
terms of any form of self-realization, must take two important
considerations into account."' First, at the very specific level of choices
among particular brands, or the qualities of specific products in themselves,
there may in some cases be more genuinely useful or more easily
accessible information available from sources other than the seller's non-
compelled commercial speech on the product's behalf. In such cases, there
may be, beyond compelled commercial speech,"' 6 government data and
reports, directly or as summarized in the media; independent non-
commercial or commercial evaluations of competing products; and,
110. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 102.
112. See, e.g., Aristotle's valuation of both the life of contemplation and the politically
active and successful life, as discussed in the sources cited supra note 99.
113. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
114. Whether, or to what degree, commercial speech not otherwise especially protected
should be constitutionally protected as sheer entertainment or as works of art presents
fascinating questions that would, unfortunately, take us too far afield.
115. We assume here that the advertising or other commercial speech is not seriously
misleading in the most direct sense. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 34 and accompanying text on the mandated disclosure of
commercial information, as for example in typical FDA drug-disclosure requirements.
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increasingly, consumer feedback in various formats available on the
Internet and various social media."' And in such cases, the alternatives to
the seller's unregulated commercial speech may limit any unique practical
value to potential consumers of the unregulated commercial speech in
question.18
Secondly, and more importantly, the practical value of unregulated
commercial speech must, as noted below," reflect the important overall,
cumulative, and aggregated effects of both unregulated and even typical
regulated forms of commercial speech on the broader culture and the public
in general. This will hold even where those effects are unintended by the
commercial speaker and often widely unrecognized, especially given the
tendency of most commercial speech-even for economically competing
products and services-to reinforce and compound, at a broader level, the
cultural effects in question. And this perhaps unintended reinforcement of
broader messages about commercialism as the default lifestyle will hold
most especially when no cultural institution or set of institutions is in a
position to realistically challenge the resulting broad "consumptionist"
ethos.
B. Commercial Speech in Contemporary Culture: Power Relationships,
Self-Realization, and a Reasonableness Standard
The case for regulating purely commercial speech, generally, on the
basis of a reasonableness standard is suggested by even a casual survey of
our culture and economy over the past several decades, set against a
broader historical context. In economic terms, there have been a number of
disturbing and unsustainable trends developing over roughly that time
frame-trends that are in some measure traceable to the overall, if often
unintended, effects of commercial speech.
It is difficult to deny the seriousness of the gradually developing
problems of consumer indebtedness and inability or unwillingness to
attempt to save meaningfully for retirement. More than a decade ago,
117. As merely one rather formal example, note that booksellers using the Amazon.com
website apparently must post customer approval percentages over some time frame. We do
not typically see high customer disapproval rates, but this suggests the efficient operation of
markets as much as it does the usefulness of the information provided. Admittedly, though,
at some point the boundary between seller-selected customer testimonials and a
meaningfully independent customer rating score may become hazy.
118. Merely as one example, consider the value of the advertising for a particular ice
cream as opposed to the practical informational value of the product's USDA nutritional
label or the available reporting of, say, the Center for Science in the Public Interest and of
the latter's critics. See generally CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
http://www.cspinet.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). In general, not all useful responses to
unregulated commercial speech will themselves take the form of (additional) unregulated
commercial speech. For an unusually controversial case, see Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S.
654 (2003) (cert. dismissed as improvidently granted).
119. See infra Section Ill.B.
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social scientists such as Juliet Schor were noticing the rise of consumer
indebtedness and credit card spending especially among the middle
class. 120 Many middle class Americans reported that even during sustained
economic prosperity, they had reserved little cushion against financial
exigencies, let alone saved significantly for retirement, and that this was in
large measure a matter not of their inability to save, but of their increasing
unwillingness to do so.121 Where Americans had not long ago saved at
least ten percent of their income, by 2005 non-retired Americans had
somehow opted, in many cases, for a negative savings rate.122 Pre-crash
bankruptcy levels were predictably high.' 2
In part, the apparent preferences of Americans in this regard-at least
for the personal spending, if not for the long-term or the broader cultural
and economic effects-are attributable to the sheer pervasiveness of
advertising and commercial speech. Advertising saturation at this point is
increasingly difficult to even roughly quantify. 4 Commercial speech is
not simply a matter of seller-consumer dialogue; commercial speech is the
ambient background-the air we breathe-as we inevitably focus
consciously and explicitly at any given time on only a few such ads.
The real methodological problem for free speech theorists has become
the increasingly hazy boundary between commercial speech and all of
commerce itself. As has recently been observed, "When a skyscraper, a
ticket stub, newspaper editorials, computer hardware and software, your
ballpoint pen, and your daily email are all ads, the question is less what to
120. See, e.g., JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: WHY WE WANT WHAT WE
DON'TNEED 19 (1998).
121. See id. at 20.
122. See JEAN M. TWENGE & W. KEITH CAMPBELL, THE NARCISSISM EPIDEMIC: LIVING
IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT 124 (2009); RoB WALKER, BUYING IN: THE SECRET DIALOGUE
BETWEEN WHAT WE BUY AND WHO WE ARE xvi (2008) (referring to the period between
2000 and 2006); ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN
ERA OF EXCESS 4-5 (1999); PETER C. WHYBROw, AMERICAN MANIA: WHEN MORE Is NOT
ENOUGH 26 (2005).
123. See TWENGE & CAMPBELL, supra note 122, at 124; FRANK, supra note 122, at 4-5.
Of course, some percentage of these effects could be said to be due to unexpected and
involuntary job loss or medical bills. But planning for such unexpected events has long
been an element of financial prudence; the increased cultural preference for consumer
spending over prudence is the phenomenon to be accounted for. On the other hand, one
could blame such a state of affairs on chronic governmental financial responsibility. But
then one would also have to explain why citizen-voters continued to focus on consumer
spending at the personal level.
124. See CARRIE MCLAREN & JANSON TORCHINSKY, AD NAUSEAM: A SURVIVOR'S
GUIDE TO AMERICAN CONSUMER CULTURE 54 (Carrie McLaren & Janson Torchinsky eds.,
2009); Philip Kotler, Foreword, in KELLOGG ON ADVERTISING & MEDIA vii (Bobby J. Calder
ed., 2008).
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count than what not to." 2 5 Even physical, brick-and-mortar stores have
become consciously intended advertisements. 12 6
The broader implication for this Article's purposes is, as the social
scientist and cultural historian Christopher Lasch recognized, that
advertising not only markets particular goods, services, and consumer
experiences, but the consumer lifestyle or broad acquisition and
consumption as a central focus of life.12 7 Lasch referred to the consumer as
"permanently unsatisfied, restless, anxious, and bored,"l 2 8  with
consumption being promoted "as a way of life," 2 9 however ultimately
unsatisfyingly. 30 This amounts precisely to the basic value of self-
realization, self-defeated.
Not surprisingly, it has thus for some time been true that college
students in particular relate less to "history, literature, or probably anything
else"' 3 ' than they do to "commercials and advertising culture."' 3 2 But from
the standpoint of self-realization, it is not as though the dominance of
commercial speech is consciously and collectively welcomed, or widely
seen as generally and collectively beneficial in some way that should not be
reasonably modified. Perhaps the dominance of commercial speech and
commercial value is seen by some as at this point simply inevitable, with
no significant cultural institutions (including religious and educational
institutions)'33 having the collective ability or willingness to engage in
substantial countervailing speech.
Higher educational institutions may at one time have seen themselves
as a refuge from, if not as promoting some alternative to, a commercially
and consumption-focused lifestyle. But in large measure, campuses today
"have gone prostrate before corporate sponsors of research that academic
administrators have neither the will nor the independent funding to
oppose." 3 4 Nor have educational institutions, including school buildings
themselves, escaped the general pervasiveness of advertising and
commercial speech.'3 5  Juliet Schor argued over a decade ago that our
nation "places a lower priority on teaching its children how to thrive
125. See McLAREN & TORCHINSKY, supra note 124, at 54.
126. See the exceptionally interesting PACO UNDERHILL, WHY WE Buy: THE SCIENCE OF
SHOPPING-UPDATED AND REVISED FOR THE INTERNET, THE GLOBAL CONSUMER, AND
BEYOND 26 (paperback ed. 2009).
127. See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE
OF DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS 72 (paperback ed. 1991).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. SCHOR, supra note 120, at 24.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, CONSUMED: How MARKETS CORRUPT CHILDREN,
INFANTILIZE ADULTS, AND SWALLOW CITIZENS WHOLE 14 (2007).
134. Id.
135. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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socially, intellectually, even spiritually, than it does on training them to
consume."1 36
Part of the problem is that, what we might call the culture of
consumption, like the only very loosely related classical vice of avarice,
can take many forms. The survey data on the importance of material goods
to Americans, and on what is perceived as a luxury or a necessity, can vary
over time. 138  One problem is that consumption of expensive, if not
unaffordable, housing, vehicles, and other material consumer durables is
only part of the focus of commercial speech. Buying more of a house than
one can realistically afford is undoubtedly a significant problem.'39 But
much commercial speech is aimed, directly or indirectly, at the purchase of
all sorts of consumer goods at any level of prestige or social status,
including inexpensive fad items. And then there is the under-discussed
segment of commercial speech aimed at a similarly broad range of the
purchase of services, as opposed to goods.
Finally, and most neglected, there is the realm of commercial speech
ultimately aimed not at the purchase of "material" goods, or really even of
services in a crucial sense, but at what we might call commercial-speech-
promoted "experiences." The experiences can be individual or group-
oriented. "Materialism" is not the focus of such commercial speech. A
trip, a cruise, or an expensive night out or a day of expensive pampering
may seem less narrowly or literally "materialistic," but may be equally
motivated and legitimized by commercial speech. Prestige and status and
social standing may be largely irrelevant in the case of some personally, or
more commonly socially, consumed market "experiences."
Underlying all the above purchases may be the unarticulated premise
that the typical solution to one's problems, even on matters such as mild
depression, anxiety, or feelings of isolation, is through consumer spending
in response to commercial speech. Where the first purchase does not work,
the fallback approach is often some other form of consumer purchase.
Many persons do have a vague sense that the genuine solution to their
problems will not take the form of a pill, a cruise, a consumptionist night
out, or a more complex life of getting and spending.140 But many persons
have, as well, the sense that it is the broader culture that is too
136. BARBER, supra note 133, at 16 (quoting SCHOR, supra note 120, at 19). For the
sake of clarity, presumably neither Schor nor Barber means to argue that we have been
trained as consumers with much prudence and judiciousness in even that capacity.
137. See Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, GLITTERING VICES: ANEw LOOK AT THE SEVEN
DEADLY SINS AND THEIR REMEDIES 100 (2009). Professor DeYoung goes on to describe a
cycle in which "first we overacquire-avarice-and then we overtrash-prodigality." Id. at
102.
138. See SCHOR, supra note 120, at 15 (on the increasing focus on material goods and
luxuries between 1975-199 1).
139. Witness recent economic events within the housing sector.
140. See SCHOR, supra note 120, at 83.
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consumptionist or "materialistic," and not they themselves as individuals,
even as they confess their own individual under-saving. 141
In any event, many Americans see a widely undesired collective
outcome as the agregate result of our various individual responses to
commercial speech. Many Americans vaguely sense the ineffectiveness
of seeking self-realization through commercial-speech-prompted
consumption. But in the absence of comparably publicized alternatives,
they may also have only modest faith that self-realization might actually
result from a less consumption-focused lifestyle, including genuine friends,
family, contribution to the well-being of others, or many sorts of spiritual
143pursuits.
In the meantime, the historical stigma against overspending or
avoidable consumer bankruptcy has, appropriately or inappropriately, been
reduced. At the extreme, "[t]he shame of consuming too much at too hifh
a level has become the shame of consuming too little at too low a level."
This re-valuation of valuesl45 may not conduce to self-fulfillment,14 6 or be
unequivocally endorsed by the public,14 7 or even be particularly stable.148
The idea of the collectively successful pursuit of self-realization over time,
largely through commercial consumption, may come to seem pathological,
self-defeating, unworthy, and immature.149
It is sometimes dramatically suggested that we have collective
embarked upon an era of "induced childishness"so or "infantilization." I
The proper metaphor is actually unclear since there is something plausible
in the claims for perpetual adolescence, delayed adulthood, and the
premature deprivation of genuine childhood as well-all with some direct
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. This theme is developed infra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
144. JAMES B. TWITCHELL, LIVING IT UP: AMERICA'S LOVE AFFAIR WITH LUXURY 166
(Simon & Schuster 2003) (2002). Of course, the standards assumed will be sub-cultural
dependent; graduate students in college towns may not be expected to be enjoying a luxury
condo lifestyle, but trips to Vegas or indulgent weekends may be considered appropriate.
145. For discussion, see PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 81-95 (Clarendon Press 2002) (1978) (discussing Nietzsche's broader
concept).
146. See infra notes 157-162 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
148. See the concerns classically raised in DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL
CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 295 (Twentieth anniversary ed. 1996), referred to infra
notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., GEOFFREY MILLER, SPENT: SEX, EVOLUTION, AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
89 (2009) ("[T]he fundamental consumerist delusion that products and brands matter, that
they constitute a reasonable set of life aspirations, seems . .. infantile, inhuman, and
existentially toxic.").
150. BARBER, supra note 133, at 3.
151. Id.
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relation to commercial speech. 5 2  It has nonetheless been argued that
today's "infantilist ethos is as potent in shaping the ideology and behaviors
of our radical consumerist society . .. as what Max Weber called the
'Protestant Ethic' was in shaping the entrepreneurial culture of . .. early
capitalist society." 5 3
Rather than embark upon an inevitably controversial attempt to pin
down Weber's precise meaning, let us merely refer to Daniel Bell's own
more recent argument. 5 4 Bell's thesis is that capitalism aimed originally at
unifying "economy, character structure, and culture in a common frame."
But this attempt at unification was not entirely successful over time. The
first "contradiction . .. is that the unfolding of capitalism destroyed the
keystone of that character-the sober, prudential, delayed gratification of
the Protestant ethic-with . .. acquisitive impulses." 55
Few would think to characterize most of today's commercial speech
as emphasizing the virtues of sobriety, prudence, or delayed gratification.
Whether a conventionally successful economy can be sustained over the
long term as the classic Weberian virtues are gradually replaced by their
opposites is in some respects a matter for important speculation.
This Article's argument in this particular respect does not rely on such
problems of unsustainability.15 6 It focuses more on the better documented
limitations, if not the self-defeating quality, of consumption motivated by
commercial speech as a path to collective self-realization and genuine
flourishing.
Many of us do feel a vague ambivalence, if not a sense of entrapment,
regarding consumer spending as a distinctively valuable, irreplaceable
source of self-realization or of happiness in any genuine form. There are
limits, particularly in advanced economies, to the extent to which
commercial speech that is intended to stimulate consumer purchases
genuinely adds to individual and collective self-realization. Of course,
152. See, e.g., JULIET B. SCHOR, BORN TO Buy: THE COMMERCIALIZED CHILD AND THE
NEW CONSUMER CULTURE (2004); SUSAN LINN, CONSUMING KIDS: THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER
OF CHILDHOOD (2004). It has been estimated that "[bly the time American children have
reached first grade, they 'will have soaked in 30,000 advertisements."' ROBERT E. LANE,
THE Loss OF HAPPINESS IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES 189 (2000).
153. BARBER, supra note 133, at 3 (referring to MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC
AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., Dover Publ'ns Dover ed. 2003)
(1958)).
154. See BELL, supra note 148, at 295.
155. Id. For an interesting qualification of the failure-to-delay-gratification thesis, see
John Tierney, Carpe Diem? Maybe Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/29/science/29tier.html.
156. For useful discussion of the slightly more technical idea of sustainability in the
context of economic growth and the environment, see LISA H. NEWTON, ETHICS AND
SUSTAINABILITY: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE MORAL LIFE (2003); SIMON
DRESNER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABILITY (2d ed. 2008); ANDRES R. EDWARDS, THE
SUSTAINABILITY REVOLUTION: PORTRAIT OF A PARADIGM SHIFT (2005).
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there are limits as well to the degree to which any reasonable regulation of
commercial speech can by itself promote genuine self-realization.
The relationship between income-which in our contemporary culture
unfortunately serves as a proxy for consumer spending '5 7-and subjective
happiness, let alone self-actualization, is murky. Upon looking at the broad
range of nations and economies, a positive correlation is found between
overall wealth and subjective reports of well-being.'5 8  But even in the
aggregate, "people in wealthy nations have not increased much in
happiness over the past decades despite the fact that average incomes have
risen dramatically." 59  Some goods, of course, are unfortunately
''positional" or desired as presumably better than the goods available to
particular other persons; in general, our desires for more and better goods
can undermine their subjective enjoyment. And in some broader sense,
"materialism can be toxic to happiness."l 60
To some degree, the limited ability of commercial speech in advanced
economies to promote happiness, let alone self-realization in the sense of
flourishing, is easily understandable. Whether we can afford to buy what is
advertised or not, we often recognize advertisements as trying to create and
then perhaps offer to remedy dissatisfaction-perhaps even dissatisfaction
with ourselves without the product or service in question.' 6 ' More broadly,
the inference, whether intended by the commercial speaker or not, is that
the remedy for dissatisfaction should, generally, take the form of spending
in response to commercial speech.
But responding to advertisements as a sort of broad self-medication
has its limits. Despite what the advertisements may tell us, consumer
spending cannot typically be a path to expressing our own individuality,
uniqueness, or distinctive autonomy; most producers in a competitive
economy at our level of technological development could not survive by
expensively catering to genuine individuality.162  Even this very idea
157. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
158. See ED DIENER ET AL., WELL-BEING FOR PUBLIC POLICY 85 (2009). For further
discussion of the possible usefulness of measures of subjective well-being, including our
surprising ability to adapt to undesired events, see Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S253 (2008).
159. ED DIENER & ROBERT BISWAS-DIENER, HAPPINESS: UNLOCKING THE MYSTERIES OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WEALTH 105 (2008).
160. Id. at 97. For a discussion of "positional" goods, see FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS
To GROWTH 118-61 (Taylor & Francis 2005) (1976). See, more broadly, JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 358
(1963). Alternatively phrased, the "toxicity" argument has been put in the following terms:
"[w]e live in a culture in which our acquisitive cravings have been promoted beyond our
needs, and the demand and strain, which that craving now inflicts on mind and body, are
beginning to exceed the flexibility inherent in our biological heritage." WHYBROW, supra
note 122, at 13.
161. See LANE, supra note 152, at 179.
162. See TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM 73 (2002).
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assumes that one's own distinctive essence as a person can, even in the
principle, be caught and expressed by advertisement-driven consumer
purchases. This will strike many of us as crudely reductionist.
This is not to suggest that commercial speech and some appropriate
level of income and spending play little role in our self-realization or
flourishing. Some such element is clearly necessary for most persons.163
But self-realization is crucially a matter of biology and psychology;
meaningfulness and spirituality; emotions; family, social, and work
relationships; values; activities and achievements; recognition; and
health.'M Even the relatively well-off in our advanced economy tend to see
their (minimally greater) happiness as flowing not from commercial-
speech-driven purchases, but from "pleasing family relationships, helping
the world, and fulfillment and pride from their work 165 3 and
accomplishments." 16 6
One writer has attempted to summarize the state of the evidence in
this fashion:
A host of careful studies suggest that across-the-board increases
in our stocks of material goods produce virtually no measurable
gains in our psychological or physical well-being. Bigger houses
and faster cars, it seems, don't make us any happier. But other
studies identify a variety of categories in which extra spending
would promote longer, healthier, and happier lives for all. For
example, we could expect such improvements if we spent more
to alleviate traffic congestion, or spent more time with our
families and friends, or provided cleaner air and drinking water
for our cities. 167
Other, generally similar listings,'6 8 often emphasizing the quality of our
social relationships,16 9 could be elaborated.
Now, it is certainly possible for commercial speech and advertising to
attempt to promote, in some limited way, the attributes that really do
significantly contribute to happiness and self-realization. There are,
163. See DIENER & BISWAS-DIENER, supra note 159, at 6. Free speech law cannot be
designed for saints and ascetics.
164. Id. at 6, 9. See also LANE, supra note 152, at 251 (noting a quarter century of
decline in "interpersonal trust").
165. Note, here, the echo of something closer to the original anxiety-driven work ethic.
See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
166. See DIENER & BISWAS-DIENER, supra note 159, at 93.
167. FRANK, supra note 122, at 6.
168. See, e.g., JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH
IN ANCIENT WISDOM 92-95 (2006) (referring to potentially controllable elements including
noise, lack of control, shame, relationships, and task-immersion). Classically, see
ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (3d ed. 1987).
169. See HAIDT, supra note 168, at 94 ("The condition that is usually said to trump all
others in importance is the strength and number of a person's relationships.").
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doubtless, a multitude of self-help books about friendship and meaning, all
supportable by book advertisements or marketing campaigns. Collections
of our best data on genuine self-realization can be marketed and sold as
commodities. Yet the overwhelming preponderance of advertising and
commercial speech supports consumption with at best only a modest
relationship to self-realization and flourishing as understood by the social
scientists cited above. And the instances of commercial speech promoting
genuine self-realization could in most cases survive broad commercial
speech regulationo tested only for reasonableness.
CONCLUSION
The point of adopting a general standard of reasonableness in
regulating commercial speech is thus only in part to combat any particular,
context-specific harms associated with some instance of commercial
speech. The main problem is not, say, that advertising leads us to overeat,
or to buy defective products, or to over-consume some particular mineral.
Our emphasis has instead been on the legitimacy of reasonably promoting a
vision of the self-realization value underlying freedom of speech. Such a
vision would involve a traditional, appealing, and social-scientifically
supportable understanding of self-realization. Such a vision maintains that
contemporary commercial speech pervades and dominates our cultural
discourse from childhood on, to the general prejudice of crucial forms of
the free speech value of self-realization.
The argument has thus focused on the most valuable forms of the
crucial free speech value of self-realization in the sense of self-fulfillment,
happiness, flourishing, and self-development. All else equal, under our
cultural circumstances and their relevant power relationships, a
reasonableness standard for the judicial examination of most
democratically adopted forms of the regulation of purely commercial
speech seems the most appropriate choice.
This is again not to suggest that the most basic consumptionist
"lessons" are either necessarily intended by commercial speakers 7 or are
necessarily endorsed by all of us who opt for commercial speech-driven
solutions to our real and perceived problems. In part, the choice of a
170. For an endorsement of the regulation of advertising directed to both adults and
children with an eye toward the sheer inescapable omnipresence of such advertising, see
KASSER, supra note 162, at 109.
171. Hypothetically, we can imagine that the persons who advertise, for example, mood
altering prescription drugs intend for those drugs to be widely prescribed and purchased-
and presumably used to some benefit by appropriate persons. But it would hardly follow
that such speakers would in the case of their own children also endorse any quickly-arrived-
at belief that prescription pharmaceuticals should be one's first recourse, as opposed to a
long-term alternative strategy of confronting life's setbacks through means other than
commercial consumption. More generally, it does not follow from the choice to widely
advertise various such pharmaceuticals that any or all of such commercial speakers believes
that any particular level of use, by the general population, is collectively desirable.
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reasonableness standard for regulating commercial speech in general
instead reflects a sense that no contemporary cultural institution is able and
inclined to meaningfully contest the self-reinforcing, basic cultural
dominance, in the relevant respects, of commercial speech.'72
It goes without saying that any speech that is intended to promote or
otherwise discuss the constitutional value of commercial speech, to argue
for a rigorous test for commercial speech regulation, or to disagree with
any of the arguments presented above (whether presented by a
commercially interested speaker or not)' will fall outside the scope of
purely commercial speech and will thus deserve the fullest constitutional
protection under strict scrutiny. 174 The debate in particular over the most
useful meaning of the free speech value of self-realization-and on that
basis, over the proper level of constitutional scrutiny for commercial
speech regulation-deserves to be robust and uninhibited.
172. Note that as the established cultural institutions typically fail to meaningfully
confront and counterbalance the most basic implied "messages" of commercial speech,
commercial speech has recently been expanding into the various social media in numerous
ways. See, e.g., TOM HIMPE, ADVERTISING IS DEAD: LONG LIVE ADVERTISING 6-14 (2008)
(on the rise of staged events and "viral" marketing); LON SAFKO & DAVID K. BRAKE, THE
SOCIAL MEDIA BIBLE: TACTICS, TOOLS, AND STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS SUCCESS 5-14 (2009)
(emphasizing the exertion of influence, rather than control, at the individual entity level);
LARRY WEBER, MARKETING TO THE SOCIAL WEB: How DIGITAL CUSTOMER COMMUNITIES
BUILD YOUR BUSINESS 3-35 (2d ed. 2009) (individual marketers as again aggregators or
community builders as opposed to broadcasters or top-down controllers, at the level of the
particular business); Ann Meyer, Facebook, Twitter, Other Social Media Help Drive
Business for Small Firms, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 27, 2009),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-04-27/news/0904260181_1_social-media-facebook-
social-networks. On the research cutting edge, see Stuart Elliott, A Neuromarketer on the
Frontier of Buyology, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/education/edlife/IDEAs-NEUROMARKETING.html
(attempting to use MRI scanning to understand consumer brand loyalties and preferences).
173. For additional more generally sympathetic approaches to the protection of
commercial speech, see, for example, Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 653 (1990) (referring to a possible "unspoken
mistrust of the free market, a fear that unrestrained speech in the commercial arena will
cause graver harm than unrestrained speech in other areas"); Martin H. Redish, Commercial
Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination,
41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 67, 106 (2007) (expressing concern over distinctive ideological
preferences or more particularized objections to products or services as underlying certain
critiques of commercial speech protection); Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and
the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 777, 778 (1993) (questioning whether contemporary advertising "really causes much
palpable social harm," as well as the realistic benefits to discourse or the society from any
regulatory regime consistent with core first-amendment values). See also LARRY
ALEXANDER, Is THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 138 n.16 (2005) (noting, in a
different context, the difficulties in somehow neutrally or fairly determining "adequacy" in
the expression of particular viewpoints).
174. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665-66 (2004); Ill. State Bd. of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
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